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I. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE NEXT GENERATION
Human rights are frequently invoked as the basis for deci-
sions about U.S. foreign policy, international relations, and hu-
manitarian intervention.1  Nonetheless, just what "human
rights" means is unclear. Within U.S. legislation and judicial
decisions, we see frequent references to civil rights, but rarely to
human rights, and international human rights law is seldom
considered part of the legal recourse available to individuals or
groups in the United States today.
A fundamental principle of international law,2 articulated by
the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunals, is that there are uni-
versal human rights which every person and every government
must respect.3 This principle was endorsed by the United Na-
1. See generally Ann Devroy & Bradley Graham, U.S. Readies Force for Policing
Haiti Following Invasion, Pentagon Adds Seven Cargo Ships for Heavy Equipment
Transport, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at Al; Helen Dewar & Ruth Marcus, Clinton In-
creases Somalia Deployment, Hundreds More to be Sent than Previously Announced,
Byrd Backs Offon Withdrawal, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1993, at A22; Thomas W. Lippman,
U.S. Troop Withdrawal Ends Frustrating Mission to Save Rwandan Lives, WASH. POST,
Oct. 3, 1994, at All; David Hoffman, Crisis in the Gulf, Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al; Ann Devroy, Clinton Lobbies for Troops, U.S. Participation
Crucial to Peacekeeping Mission President Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at A29.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 102(1) (1987), provides: "A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as
such by the international community of states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by
international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the ma-
jor legal systems of the world." Id.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that the
Court, in making decisions in accordance with international law, shall apply interna-
tional conventions; international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law; the general principles of law "recognized by civilized nations"; and, as subsidiary
sources, judicial decisions and the teachings of "the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060 T.S. 993.
3. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individu-
als Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1982) ("The [war crimes] tribunals
pointed out that international law was not concerned solely with the actions of sovereign
states, but 'impose[d] duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states.'")
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tions Charter 4 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 5
and in the many human rights conventions that have since come
into force. 6
In international law scholarship, human rights are often di-
vided into three classifications or "generations." Civil and politi-
cal rights are referred to as first generation rights; economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights as the second generation; and "group"
rights, including the right of peoples to self-determination and
the protection of minority groups within nations, as third gen-
eration rights.7 Sometimes referred to as solidarity rights, third
generation rights can also describe rights that are asserted on
behalf of all people, such as a right to economic, social, and cul-
tural development or to a healthy environment.
This essay proposes the incorporation of international hu-
man rights law, particularly that of third generation rights, into
the discourse about the rights of those identified as minorities 8
in the United States. Third generation rights focus primarily on
the rights of groups, not individuals. 9 In contrast, U.S. law tends
4. Charter of United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1153 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 IIIA, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). Approved unanimously by the U.N. General Assem-
bly in 1948, the Universal Declaration elaborates on the requirement of the U.N. Charter
that aU member states agree to promote and observe "human rights and fundamental
freedoms." Id. According to Professor Sohn, "[t]he Declaration, as an authoritative list-
ing of human rights, has become a basic component of international customary law,
binding on all states." Sohn, supra note 3, at 17.
6. Sohn, supra note 3, at 10. ("The General Assembly of the United Nations later
affirmed these Nuremberg principles.")
7. The generational terminology was first articulated by French scholar Karel
Vasak. See KEVIN T. JOHNSON, CHARTING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (1994).
8. The term "minorities" is used here to refer to groups identified as distinct be-
cause of their ethnic, religious, racial, cultural, linguistic, or other characteristics, that
comprise a numerical minority and do not exercise dominant political power within a
nation. Unfortunately, in the United States, the term "minority" seems to be increas-
ingly used as a code word for "nonwhite." That is not the meaning I ascribe to it in this
essay. The United Nations University has published a WORLD GUIDE OF ETHNIC MI-
NORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (R. Stavenhagen ed., 1988), and the Minority Rights
Group has published a series of reports on hundreds of minorities. See Gudmundur Al-
fredsson, Minority Rights and a New World Order, in BROADENING THE FRONTIERS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 56 (Donna Gomien ed., 1993). See also Roland Oliver, The Minority
Rights Group: What's in a Name, in MINORITIES: A QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 1 (Ben
Whitaker ed., 1984).
9. Third generation or "solidarity" rights are sometimes considered to encompass
the rights of all peoples, such as the right to development, or the rights to a healthy envi-
ronment. I use the term in a somewhat more restricted manner, focusing on the rights of
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to define all rights as individual rights. Accepting this limitation
on the definition of rights may prevent us from even considering
significant solutions to social problems.
Admittedly, there are dangers in describing all human af-
fairs-human needs, potential, passion, and suffering-in terms
of quantifiable, enforceable, legally definable "rights."10 All of
culture and society cannot be collapsed into law. Identifying
"rights" in response to all human needs may cause currently rec-
ognized civil and political rights to be taken less seriously, with
the result that there is less overall protection for human rights."
However, it is important to consider ways in which the defining
and recognition of rights affects culture and society.
Although not usually described in these terms, many of the
movements to improve people's living and working conditions in
the United States can be seen as efforts to obtain what are rec-
ognized by numerous international conventions, organizations,
scholars, and activists as second and third generation human
rights. Housing, welfare, public education, health care, affirma-
tive action, and handicapped access legislation involve second
generation human rights. Groups that assert such rights are of-
ten, in that process, exercising third generation "solidarity"
rights. Recognizing this could allow those groups to benefit from
a wealth of international law and the experiences of others who
have struggled for similar rights. Such recognition could also
identified groups within nation-states.
10. Richard Rorty identifies some of the dangers in this approach:
The language of "rights" is the language of the documents that have sparked
the most successful attempts to relieve human suffering in postwar Amer-
ica-the series of Supreme Court decisions that began with Brown v. Board
of Education and continued through Roe v. Wade ....
Yet the trouble with rights talk ... is that it makes political morality not a
result of political discourse ... but rather an unconditional moral imperative
.... Instead of saying, for example, that the absence of various legal protec-
tions makes the lives of homosexuals unbearably difficult, that it creates un-
necessary human suffering for our fellow Americans, we have come to say
that these protections must be instituted in order to protect homosexuals'
rights.
Richard Rorty, What's Wrong with "Rights," HARPER'S MAG., June 1996, at 15. See also
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 111, 122 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993) (advocating an approach that "sets aside Kant's question "What is Man?" and sub-
stitutes the question "What sort of world can we prepare for our great-grandchildren?").
11. For a discussion of the risk that the recognition of new rights will undermine
existing rights, see Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for
Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 607-08 (1984).
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clarify connections between what are perceived to be domestic
concerns and struggles for human rights in other parts of the
world.
Finally, framing the discussion of domestic rights in the
broader context of international law may allow us to see groups
with apparently disparate interests as being engaged in the
same or parallel struggles. Incorporating international human
rights principles could provide common ground among minority
groups within the United States, among poor and working peo-
ples generally, and those who struggle for similar rights in the
United States and in other countries.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
A. Emergence of a Law of Human Rights to
Supplement the Law of Nations
International law is generally regarded, at least in the
"classical" western tradition, as governing relations between na-
tions. It is the law agreed upon between nations and rests on a
foundation of state sovereignty. Within this framework, the
rights of individuals are to be protected by their own govern-
ments or, through comity or agreement, by the governments of
other nations. 12
Human rights law departs from this framework in two ways.
It posits, first, that people have fundamental rights under inter-
national law, even as against their own governments; and sec-
ond, that other nations and international organizations can in-
tervene in what would otherwise be a nation's domestic affairs in
order to protect those rights. Professor Louis B. Sohn has de-
scribed this as a "silent revolution" which "deprived the sover-
eign states of the lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of
rights under international law. States have had to concede to
ordinary human beings the status of subject of international
law."13
Given impetus by the horrors of World War II, much that is
currently recognized as human rights law has developed in the
12. See generally Sohn, supra note 3 (tracing the history of international law).
13. Id. at 1.
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past fifty years. There is an emerging consensus about the exis-
tence of certain fundamental human rights and a large and
growing body of international conventions on specific subjects.' 4
Within the arena of international human rights, the United
States asserts itself as a leader, but often defines both rights and
remedies more narrowly than do other countries.
Concern for human rights was invoked as cause for United
States intervention by President Bush in the 1990 Gulf War' 5
and by President Clinton when sending U.S. troops to Haiti, So-
malia, Bosnia, and Zaire. 16 When the United States takes action
in other countries, governmental officials routinely give a num-
ber of reasons which often include allegations of human rights
violations along with the protection of U.S. national security in-
terests.17 One result of this generalized use of human rights as a
basis for United States intervention is that it is difficult to draw
clear causal connections between the rights violation and the ac-
tion taken to address it. Nonetheless, the justifications given for
various interventions and the position of the United States with
respect to various international human rights conventions' 8 il-
lustrate that the United States generally views civil and political
rights as the only "real," or enforceable, human rights.
B. Individual Rights: Civil and Political;
Economic, Social, and Cultural
First generation, or civil and political, rights are sometimes
characterized as "negative" rights because they generally require
governments to refrain from interfering with an individual's
right to participate in civil society or the political process. As in-
14. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 600 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force for the United States, Nov.
20, 1994); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14.
15. See Hoffman, supra note 1, at Al.
16. See Devroy & Graham, supra note 1, at Al; Dewar & Marcus, supra note 1, at
A22; Devroy, supra note 1, at A29; Lippman, supra note 1, at All.
17. In these situations it is often difficult to discern just what the U.S. government's
position is with respect to which rights are being violated by whom, and what responses
or interventions are acceptable under international law. Additional confusion arises be-
cause, under international law, it is sometimes acceptable for a state to intervene in the
affairs of another state for humanitarian reasons (e.g. to provide relief to victims of a
drought) even if there are no explicit violations of international human rights law.
18. See text accompanying notes 49-64.
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ternational organizations attempted to articulate human rights
in the period just after World War II, civil, political, social, eco-
nomic, and cultural rights were initially proposed as a unified
package, spelling out the promises in the 1948 Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. 19 These rights were ultimately split
into two groups, with the understanding that civil and political
rights were to be implemented immediately. Perhaps because
there was something close to consensus on civil and political
rights,20 they have been identified as the "first generation" of
human rights.
The primary international agreement that specifically ad-
dresses first generation rights is the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).21
The ICCPR recognizes the rights of every human being to life,
liberty and security of person; to privacy; to freedom from tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment; to immunity from arbitrary arrest; to freedom from
slavery; to a fair trial; to recognition as a person before the
law; to immunity from retroactive sentences; to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; to freedom of opinion and
expression; to liberty of movement and peaceful assembly; and
to freedom of association.22
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR)23 addresses second generation rights by
expanding on provisions of the Universal Declaration. It pro-
claims a right to work; to equal pay and protection against sys-
temic unemployment; to formation of trade unions; to rest and
19. The United Nations Charter identifies among the purposes of the organization
the achieving of "international cooperation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to
race, sex, language, or religion ... ." U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3.
20. Sohn, supra note 3, at 32.
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)[hereinafter ICCPR].
22. Anne Paxton Wagley, Newly Ratified International Human Rights Treaties and
the Fight Against Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 88, 90 (1995) (citing
ICCPR, supra note 21, pt. II).
23. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)[hereinafter ICESCRI.
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leisure; to food, clothing, housing, and medical care; to social se-
curity, education, and participation in the cultural life of the
community; and to the protection of scientific, literary, and ar-
tistic production. 24 Second generation rights are also recognized
in regional agreements such as the American Convention on
Human Rights, 25 the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 26 and the Banjul Charter.27
The United States has ratified the ICCPR, but not the
ICESCR.28 A common explanation of the current U.S. position of
accepting first but not second generation rights as universal is
that if a people can choose their own government, they will en-
sure that it adequately protects their rights. This theory was
exemplified by the Reagan administration's emphasis on free
elections and helps explain why talk of human rights is so fre-
quently intertwined with talk of "democracy."29
24. Many of these are rooted in President Roosevelt's 1941 proposal for an interna-
tional instrument dealing with economic and social rights in his "Four Freedoms" speech.
He identified these as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom
from fear, and freedom from want. Eighth Annual Message to Congress, Jan. 6, 1941,
reprinted in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, at
2855 (1966), cited in Sohn, supra note 3, at 33 n.162.
25. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, 114 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
26. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser.L.fV/I1.23, Doc. 21, Rev. (1979), adopted by the Ninth International Con-
ference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, arts. XI-XVI
(covering the right to health, education, the cultural life of the community, work, leisure,
and social security).
27. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), available in 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982). See id. arts. 15-18 (including rights to work, to health, to education and culture,
and to protection of the family).
28. The ICCPR and the ICESCR were opened for signature in 1966 and signed by
President Carter in 1977. The ICCPR was not, however, ratified by the U.S. Senate until
1992, and the ICESCR has yet to be ratified.
Philip Alston has argued that those within the United States who advocate
ratification of the ICESCR and support the recognition of second generation human
rights should explicitly identify the benefits of ratification and directly address the diffi-
culties of implementation. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
365 (1990). With the end of the Cold War, there may be new opportunities to engage in
this direct approach. See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and In-
ternational Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L.J.
79 (1992).
29. According to Harold Koh, "Treating human rights and democracy as a unit ac-
tually disguises two competing rationales for promoting human rights as part of U.S.
foreign policy." Harold Hongju Koh, Democracy and Human Rights in the United States
Foreign Policy?: Lessons from the Haitian Crises, 48 SMU L. REV. 189, 194 (1994). See
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Advocates of second generation rights argue that, by them-
selves, freedom of speech or the right to vote matter little to
people who are starving. Their view is that those who control
wealth and power do not want to acknowledge the right to ade-
quate food, shelter, medical care, or jobs because such acknowl-
edgment could entail a redistribution of resources, either within
a nation or between nations.
The 1968 Declaration of the Teheran International Confer-
ence on Human Rights stated that "[slince human rights and
fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil
and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social
and cultural rights, is impossible."30 President Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania asked:
What freedom has our subsistence farmer? ... [h]e scratches a
bare living from the soil provided the rains do not fail; his
children work at his side without schooling, medical care, or
even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to vote and to
speak as he wishes. But these freedoms are much less real to
him than his freedom to be exploited. 31
C. Group Rights: Solidarity and Self-
Determination
Both first and second generation rights are essentially indi-
vidual rights, the right of each person to freedom of association
or due process of law, to food or education, to be free from dis-
crimination based on ethnicity, race, religion, national origin, or
gender. Third generation human rights are, broadly speaking,
the rights of groups. According to Professor Sohn:
also Larry Minear, The Forgotten Human Agenda, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 76 (1988-89)
(criticizing the Reagan administration's focus on democracy over humanitarian con-
cerns). The association between human rights and "democracy" is also illustrated by the
1983 creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private corporation
which obtained federal funding to "foster the infrastructure of democracy" in other coun-
tries. "The NED intersected with human rights efforts in its insistence that democratic
institutions ultimately-and sometimes in the short run-were the most solid bulwarks
of human rights." JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLE'S CHARTER:
THE PURSUIT OF RIGHTS IN AMERICA 433 (1991).
30. 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 41) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41, para. 13 (1968),
cited in Sohn, supra note 3, at 18 n.63.
31. BURNS & BURNS, supra note 29, at 411.
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[I]nternational law not only recognizes inalienable rights of
individuals, but also recognizes certain collective rights that
are exercised jointly by individuals grouped into larger com-
munities, including peoples and nations. These rights are still
human rights; the effective exercise of collective rights is a
precondition to the exercise of other rights, political or eco-
nomic or both. If a community is not free, most of its members
are also deprived of many important rights.
8 2
Article 1, Section 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR read
as follows: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment."33 The term "peoples" has not been defined in the inter-
national agreements or documents where it has been used.34 It
appears to denote groups that are neither individuals nor state
entities; but, as James Crawford notes, the definition may have
to depend on the context.3 5 While there is some disagreement
about what rights are specifically included in the third genera-
tion, there is agreement on the principle that "[a]ll peoples have
the right to self-determination." 36  Self-determination is gener-
ally acknowledged to include the right of people to choose their
own government as well as the right of a nation to be free from
domination by another nation.37
32. Sohn, supra note 3, at 48. See also Roland Rich, The Right to Development: A
Right of Peoples? in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 44 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (noting that
not only is recognition of a group necessary to allow certain human rights to be protected,
but that in certain instances, such as laws against genocide and apartheid, the rights are
granted to the group itself).
33. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, § 1; ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1, § 1.
34. Alfredsson, supra note 8, at 71. See also Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In
Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 24-36 (James Crawford ed.,
1988) (noting three different ways in which the term "rights of peoples" is used in inter-
national law).
35. James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 169 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
36. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, § 1; ICESCR, supra note 23 art. 1, § 1. Although
the ICCPR identifies the right of self-determination of minorities, it sidesteps the ques-
tion of group rights by granting rights to members of minority groups rather than to the
groups themselves. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27. According to Vagts and Wilson, "there
are at least two group rights so firmly established as principles of international law-the
right of peoples to self-determination and the prohibition against genocide-that it is dif-
ficult to deny that groups can have rights in international law." Detlev Vagts & Heather
A. Wilson, The Rights of Peoples, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 670, 671 (1989) (book review).
37. Sohn, supra note 3, at 48.
396 [Vol. 28:2
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The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981,
commonly referred to as the Banjul Charter, recognizes in addi-
tion the right to development, the right to peace, and the right to
a healthy environment.38 There have also been proposals for a
third international human rights covenant featuring "third gen-
eration solidarity rights."39 This covenant would include such
rights as the right to benefit from the common heritage of man-
kind, the right to live in a healthy and ecologically sound envi-
ronment, and the right to humanitarian assistance, as well as
the rights identified in the Universal Declaration and the Banjul
Charter.
James Crawford divides the rights of "peoples" into two gen-
eral categories:
One immediately apparent category is the group of rights
which in some respect deal with the existence and cultural or
political continuation of groups. This category would include
the right to self-determination, the rights of minorities, and
the rights of groups to existence (i.e. as a minimum, not to be
subjected to genocide). But ... the phrase "rights of peoples"
tends to be used ... to refer to the other and more miscellane-
ous category of rights, concerned with a variety of issues relat-
ing to the economic development and the 'coexistence' of peo-
ples. This second category includes rights in respect of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, rights to de-
velopment, to the environment and to international peace and
security.40
Although the United States participated in the drafting of
both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both of which recognize some
rights of peoples, it has consistently refused to acknowledge
third generation human rights. In 1984 the United States with-
drew from the United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), "at least in part because of UNESCO's
38. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights June, 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3fRev. 5, arts. 19-24 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982). The right to development-as a right distinct from that of an individual
to live in a developed country-has been recognized by a United Nations working group
as having both collective and individual dimensions. See Report of the Working Group to
the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1489, at 5 (1982), cited in Sohn,
supro note 3, at 54 n.273.
39. Alston, supra note 11, at 610.
40. Crawford, supra note 35, at 57.
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support for 'peoples' rights' and the potential conflict between
this 'third generation' of human rights and the protection of in-
dividual rights."4 1  Representatives of the United States have
articulated a fear that the recognition of group rights will serve
to undermine the rights of individuals. 42 Some fear that this is
happening in countries such as Algeria or Afghanistan, where
assertions of power by religious groups appears to impose severe
restrictions on the rights of individuals.
This view has been countered with the argument that group
rights not only complement individual rights, but that often-
times individual rights cannot be exercised until group rights are
protected. 43 This is reflected reflected in Article 27 of the
ICCPR, which states that members of ethnic, religious, or lin-
guistic minorities "shall not be denied the right, in community
with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own lan-
guage."44
III. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
A. International Human Rights Law in U.S.
Courts
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States:
41. Vagts & Wilson, supra note 36, at 670.
42. This problem is illustrated by the situation in United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641 (1977), in which federal criminal law, including the felony murder rule, was
applied to Native American defendants for a murder on a reservation. Had a non-Native
American committed the offense, state law would have applied and the defendants could
not have been convicted of murder. Clearly in this situation laws made ostensibly to pro-
tect the group harmed the individual rights of members of the protected group.
43. See Gillian Triggs, The Rights of "Peoples" and Individual Rights: Conflict or
Harmony?, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 143-45 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
44. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union established
semi-autonomous regions, recognizing that the stability of the union depended in large
part on the belief of its many minorities that their individual rights could not be assured
unless their group rights were protected. As the Soviet Union broke up, the same fear
was expressed by ethnic Russians living in areas controlled by other groups. See gener-
ally Henry Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for
Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539 (1991).
[Vol. 28:2
1996-97] INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
International law is law like other law, promdting order,
guiding, restraining, regulating behavior. States, the princi-
pal addressees of international law, treat it as law, consider
themselves bound by it, attend to it with a sense of legal obli-
gation and with concern for the consequences of violation ....
It is part of the law of the United States, respected by Presi-
dents and Congresses, and by the States, and given effect by
the courts.4
5
The U.S. Constitution provides that, along with the Consti-
tution and the laws made pursuant to it, "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land."46 As the Supreme Court
stated in The Paquete Habana, "[i]nternational law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by courts of jus-
tice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination."
47
The United States played a leading role in the formation of
both the League of Nations, where President Woodrow Wilson
advocated strongly for the right of peoples to self-determination,
and the United Nations. Serving as the U.S. representative to
the United Nations Economic and Social Council and as a mem-
ber of its Commission on Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt
worked tirelessly on the drafting and implementation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.48 However, shortly af-
ter the 1952 presidential election, the Eisenhower administra-
tion "announced that it was washing its hands of the United
Nations human rights covenants" 49 and, in the words of David
Forsythe, "U.S. human rights policy was collapsed into its anti-
Communist policy."50
Concern has been expressed that international human rights
standards might be imposed on the United States by other na-
tions. In 1951, Senator Bricker, a Republican from Ohio, intro-
duced a constitutional amendment that would have restricted
45. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, pt. I, ch. 1.
46. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
47. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). But see Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989) (rejecting international norms and upholding the constitutionality of
capital punishment for juveniles).
48. BURNS & BURNS, supra note 29, at 421-24.
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id.
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the president's treaty-making powers, arguing that ratification
of human rights treaties would give other nations undue influ-
ence over U.S. domestic policy and could force the end of laws
mandating racial segregation.5 1 The Eisenhower administration
avoided a struggle over the proposed constitutional amendment
by promising that no human rights conventions would be sub-
mitted for ratification by the Senate.
This moratorium prevailed through the Nixon and Ford
administrations. No human rights conventions were, in fact,
submitted until the Carter administration, and those which were
then submitted contained reservations so significant that some
believe they render the conventions meaningless.5 2 A common
argument is that those rights addressed in the conventions are
already protected by U.S. law anyway, thus justifying the reser-
vations that explicitly limit the effect of human rights treaties to
current domestic interpretation of protections under the Consti-
tution. For example, ratification of the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) 3 was conditioned on the Helms Proviso, which states
that the United States need not alter its domestic laws in any
way to conform to the treaty.54
When he came into office President Jimmy Carter an-
nounced that the United States "commitment to human rights
must be absolute," 55 and he identified food, shelter, health care,
and education as basic human rights. 56 Carter signed both the
ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1977, as well as the American Con-
51. Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Human Rights Protection in the United States:
An Internationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 15, 19-20 (1996). See also
Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in
the United States: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988).
This, of course, is a good example of how U.S. law could be influenced in a positive way
by international human rights law.
52. See Thomas, supra note 51, at 20; William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a
Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INW'L L. 277 (1995).
53. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969).
54. 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Pell), cited in
Thomas, supra note 51, at 20 n.23. See also FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT,
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RE-
SEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 190-91 (1996).
55. BURNS & BURNS, supra note 29, at 427 (citing Carter's inaugural address, Janu-
ary 1977).
56. Id. at 434 (citing 1977 speech of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance).
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vention on Human Rights (ACHR)57 and the CERD. However,
the early promises were outweighed by the political realities.
The ICCPR was not ratified by the U.S. Senate until 1992 and
the CERD was only ratified in 1994. The ICESCR and ACHR
have yet to be ratified. 58
The Reagan administration came into office attacking the
human rights policies of the Carter administration. In the words
of James Leach, it argued that "U.S. human rights policy ought
to moderate its concern about the behavior of 'traditional' (and
friendly) authoritarian regimes and concentrate instead on the
abuses of 'revolutionary' (that is to say, Marxist) governments. '"59
Until the Clinton administration, the only major interna-
tional human rights convention that the United States ratified
was the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 60 which was opened for signature in 1948 and
entered into force for the United States in 1989. The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment6' and the CERD, which was opened
for signature in 1966, entered into force for the United States in
1994. The United States has signed but not yet ratified the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.62
Even though the United States has not ratified many of the
human rights conventions, and has extensive reservations with
respect to those it has ratified, much of the core of international
human rights law is applicable to the United States as part of
57. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OEA/Ser. L./VIII.23 Doc. Rev. 2, (entered into force July 18, 1978).
58. See U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 37-39 (2d ed. 1996).
59. James Leach, The 97th Congress and Human Rights Law: View Three, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, 1981-1983 (Andrew J. Samet ed.,
1984).
60. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
61. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex 39, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
62. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 33.
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customary international law.63 It should be noted that according
to the Vienna Convention on Treaties 64--another convention
which the United States has signed but not ratified, but which
the State Department has explicitly recognized as articulating
customary international law on the subject-a state which has
signed a treaty has an obligation to refrain from conduct which
undermines the purpose or object of that treaty unless the state
has made explicit its intent not to ratify the treaty.
As second and third generation human rights come to be ac-
cepted as emerging customary international law, it is interesting
to consider the implications of recognizing these human rights
within our domestic legal system. The struggles of many groups,
including those groups identified as racial or ethnic minorities,
can be seen as efforts to obtain second and third generation
rights.65 The following section addresses the possibility of re-
envisioning U.S. history and current social conditions in terms of
third generation or group rights, and considers some benefits of
such an approach.
B. Group Rights in the United States: An
Historical Perspective
The history of U.S. law is, in many respects, a history of the
struggles of groups to assert or protect their rights, identities, or
cultures. In March 1995, as part of the review of its first report
63. Professor Sohn says of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR:
Although the existence of the norms embodied in these documents cannot be
denied, controversy has been raging for almost forty years about their bind-
ing character and practical effect .... The better view is that these documents
have become a part of international customary law and, as such, are binding
on all states.
Sohn, supra note 3, at 12. See Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human
Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts,
10 MICH. J. IN'L L. 543 (1989).
64. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
65. The position that strong protection of civil and political rights will ensure that
basic socio-economic needs are met is undermined by reports of widespread hunger,
homelessness, and poor health in the United States. A 1990 report of the Children's De-
fense Fund noted that "a black child born in inner-city Boston had less chance of living to
its first birthday than a child born in Peru, Uruguay, or North Korea"; that every year
10,000 American children died because of poverty; that 100,000 were homeless; that
nearly 750,000 were abused or neglected. BURNS & BURNS, supra note 29, at 447.
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under the ICCPR, the United States came before the Human
Rights Committee of the United Nations Economic and Social
Council. John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, stated that "[t]he United
States had a history of racism, slavery and racial segregation
[that] had among other factors posed obstacles to the full and
optimal enjoyment of all Americans of the rights reflected in the
Covenant."66 Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Deval
Patrick "admitted that discrimination on the basis of race, eth-
nicity and gender persisted in the United States-not just the ef-
fects of past discrimination, but 'current, real life, pernicious dis-
crimination of the here and now."' 67
Since the first resistance of Native Americans to colonial
rule, the first slave revolts, and the first efforts by Mexicans to
prevent annexation of their lands, peoples who are now identi-
fied as "racial minorities" in this country have organized and
fought for group rights. Some of these have been defined as the
struggles of peoples for self-determination, most notably, of
course, the efforts of Native Americans to retain some sover-
eignty over their lands and their people. 68
Other explicit assertions of what could be termed third gen-
eration human rights can be seen in what are often labeled
"nationalist" movements. For example, "[t]o advocate self-
determination" was one of the eight key points of the Universal
Negro Improvement Association founded by Marcus Garvey in
the early 1900s. 69
Malcolm X advocated the need to move from individual
rights to group rights, and the need to see the struggle for these
rights in an international context. In 1965, just weeks before his
death, he said:
66. Wagley, supra note 22, at 102 (citing UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASES, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, Human
Rights Committee Continues Examination of United States Report, HR/CT/404, Mar. 31,
1995; Human Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Initial Report of United
States: Committee Experts Raise Questions On Use of Death Penalty, Rights of Aliens,
Among Others, HRJCT/404, Mar. 31, 1995).
67. Id. at 102.
68. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instru-
ment ofRacial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self-Determination,
8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51 (1991); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Fron-
tiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples'
Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660.
69. AMY JACQUES GARVEY, GARvEY AND GARVEYISM 32 (1970).
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[Our] problem has to be internationalized .... [Wlhen 22 mil-
lion black Americans see that our problem is the same as the
problem of the people who are being oppressed in South Viet-
nam, and the Congo and Latin America, then the oppressed
people of the earth make up the majority that can demand and
not as a minority that has to beg. 70
In recent decades, these struggles have taken many forms,
from community and church-based grassroots organizations; to
groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), the Urban League, the League of
United Latin American Citizens, or the Japanese-American Citi-
zens League, which tended to support assimilation; to organiza-
tions such as the Black Panthers, Brown Berets, and Young
Lords which more explicitly advocated the empowerment of
groups based on their ethnic or racial affiliations. Regardless of
their particular ideological bent, these movements themselves
can be seen as assertions of third generation human rights, even
as they have organized to demand first and second generation
rights. The transition from an unarticulated to a conscious as-
sertion of third generation rights could significantly effect how
such movements are organized and perceived.
What we think of as the traditional civil rights movement
was precisely that, a struggle for civil and political rights. It was
a struggle for the right to vote, for equal access to social and po-
litical institutions, and for the right to participate, as individu-
als, on equal footing with all other individuals in civil society.
Martin Luther King, Jr. was in the process of moving from de-
mands for first generation rights to second generation rights
when he was killed. As early as 1963 he had stated, "[tihe Negro
is not struggling for some abstract, vague rights, but for concrete
and prompt improvement in his way of life. What will it profit
him to be able to send his children to an integrated school if the
family income is insufficient to buy them school clothes?"'71
By the 1967 convention of the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference, King "was searching for an alternative to urban
rioting along the lines of organized mass civil disobedience, while
70. MALCOLM X: THE MAN AND HIs TIMES 257-58 (John Henrik Clarke ed., 1969),
quoted in Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An In-
ternationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 18 (1996).
71. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 148 (1963).
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fusing demands for economic justice and an end to the Vietnam
War with his civil rights agenda. '72 This led to plans for the
Poor People's Campaign, with its call for a $30 billion annual
appropriation for antipoverty efforts, a full-employment act,
guaranteed annual income, and annual funding for at least
500,000 units of low-cost housing.73 Other movements such as
the United Farm Workers' struggle for economic justice, and the
pursuit of universal health care and welfare rights were and
continue to be struggles for second generation rights.
Minority rights in the United States-first or second gen-
eration-are most often framed as the right to participate as in-
dividuals in the mainstream political, economic, and social insti-
tutions despite being members of certain groups. Less frequently
have there been assertions of the collective rights of minority
groups, at least racial or ethnic minorities, to some form of self-
determination. 74
C. The Potential in Recognizing Third Generation
Rights
As noted above, second generation rights are not generally
acknowledged as human rights in the United States. For exam-
ple, in the introduction to the 1982 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, the Reagan administration declared that the
U.S. government does not accept the idea of economic, social, and
cultural rights.75 Rather, individuals are to be given "equal ac-
cess" to obtaining economic, social, or cultural resources, but
they are not guaranteed to anyone. 76 Even the basics of food,
72. Michael Ratner & Eleanor Stein, W. Haywood Burns: To Be of Use, 106 YALE
L.J. 753, 767 (1996) (citation omitted).
73. Id. According to Clayborne Carson:
The "Black Power" rhetoric of the period after Malcolm's death owed much to
his influence, but the new African-American racial consciousness also re-
sulted from internal changes in the civil rights protest movement-
particularly the increasing involvement of poor and working-class blacks and
the growing emphasis on economic and political empowerment.
CLAYBORNE CARSON, MALCOLM X: THE FBI FILE 32 (1991).
74. It is possible that such assertions are less likely due to the individual focus of
civil and political rights under the U.S. Constitution. Or, perhaps, such movements have
encountered much stronger resistance and have not survived.
75. Christopher J. Dodd, The 97th Congress and Human Rights Law: View One, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, 1981-1983, at 57, 60 (Andrew J.
Samet ed., 1984).
76. Senator Dodd characterized the Reagan administration's position on economic
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housing, and medical care are no longer guaranteed to children.
Increasingly, these resources are to be allocated not to all who
live in the United States, but exclusively to U.S. citizens. In
other words, second generation rights are envisioned as political
rights, rather than human rights.
The struggles to obtain both first and second generation
rights in the United States have required organization by the
groups affected, and this has required a sense of identification
with those groups. The ensuing backlash has attacked both the
formation of these organized movements and the substance of
their demands. To make the first generation rights that they se-
cured at such great cost meaningful and to turn the tide that is
eroding existing second generation rights, minority groups may
need to assert third generation rights within American society.
A founding principle of the United States is the protection of in-
dividual rights and liberties from the tyranny of the group. Per-
haps as a result, the presumption that all rights are individual
rights, and that all remedies are individual remedies, is deeply
entrenched in mainstream American thought. International
human rights law and the analyses that are being developed on
the rights of peoples within nations could be useful to groups
within the United States who wish to expand this framework.
77
The idea of using international human rights standards to
bring about change within this country is not a new one. U.S.
civil rights organizations were among the first
national groups in the world to petition the United Nations for
relief from abusive conduct by a member state. In 1947, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) filed a petition before the United Nations denounc-
ing race discrimination in the United States. The Civil Rights
Congress filed a second petition in 1951, charging the United
States with genocide under the 1948 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes of Genocide.78
and social rights as one in which, rather than rights, these are "objectives to be imple-
mented gradually in accordance with the available resources of a given country." Id. at
64 (emphasis added).
77. See Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1990) (proposing that international human rights standards be incor-
porated as binding domestic law).
78. Thomas, supra note 51, at 17 (citing Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold
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More recently, indigenous peoples in the United States have
been incorporating international human rights law into their
struggles.
For America's indigenous peoples, rights are no longer framed
entirely by the provisions of the Constitution and legislative
enactments. Indigenous peoples' demands are increasingly
asserted within dual frameworks. One framework is narrow.
It consists of rights claims recognized by the American legal
system (e.g., due process violations or breaches of trust), even
though the rights, as framed, may not accurately embody the
cultural, spiritual, and political experience of the group in-
volved. A second framework is expansive. It consists of claims
of transnational moral authority cast in the language of inter-
national human rights (e.g., right to self-determination). 79
As domestic remedies become increasingly constricted, 80 in-
ternational law may offer additional relief, and conversely, it is
possible that domestic remedies will be expanded by the incorpo-
ration of international human rights law. Successfully asserting
the emerging international law of third generation human rights
as part of the legal recourse available in the United States could
establish common ground among various groups in the United
States and help clarify some of the connections between domestic
issues and international struggles.
In the face of persistent racial divisions 81 and the widening
gap between the rich and the poor,8 2 in an era when it is becom-
ing more difficult to ensure food, shelter, and basic medical care
for all, it may be helpful to reconsider the framework of rights in
the United States. The view that the government is only re-
sponsible for ensuring the civil and political rights of its citizens,
War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 94-98 (1988)).
79. Eric K Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawai-
ians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1994).
80. See Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash,
81 IowA L. REV. 1467, 1468-71 (1996).
81. See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1995)
82. The years of the Reagan and Bush Administration saw the incomes of the rich-
est five percent of the population grow nearly sixty percent while the incomes of the bot-
tom sixty percent of the population decreased roughly fifteen percent. During this pe-
riod, the poverty rate grew to more than thirteen percent of the population, yet the
richest one percent experienced an increase in their incomes of more than one hundred
percent. See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 19-20 (citing THOMAS WHITE, BUSINESS ETHICS:
A PHILOSOPHICAL READER (1993)).
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and that these rights can only be exercised by individuals, is one
choice-but there are others.
Lawyers and legal scholars can contribute to efforts to ex-
pand the scope of human rights in the United States, not only by
pursuing such rights and recourse as are identified by the do-
mestic legal system,83 but by broadening the parameters of that
system itself. Dorothy Thomas states that, "[l]ong isolated from,
and at times dismissive of the rights movement abroad, U.S.
groups could benefit from the insights and solidarity of their in-
ternational colleagues. The experiences of activists elsewhere
can contribute to the conceptualization and implementation of
domestic advocacy strategies."8
4
Commenting on the struggles over ratification of the
ICESCR, Philip Alston notes that "the U.S. debate needs to be
much more internally focused ... . [RIatification should not be
seen primarily as a foreign policy issue but, rather, as one of do-
mestic policy."8 5 Similarly, perhaps debates about third genera-
tion human rights should be taken seriously as issues of domes-
tic policy.
D. Expanding the Discourse
This essay contends that an understanding of the interna-
tional human rights framework could help secure basic rights for
racial and ethnic minorities, poor people, and other groups
within the United States and that it would be ill-advised to see
these struggles as isolated from those of people in all parts of the
world to obtain first, second, or third generation rights. The
economic resources available in the United States depend on
global economic, political, and military relationships, and U.S.
government policy toward internal minorities has often been in-
fluenced by international affairs. As the Justice Department
noted in its amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education, "[t]he
United States is trying to prove to the people of the world, of
every nationality, race and color, that a free democracy is the
83. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347 (1993) (describing domestic remedies for violations at international law).
84. Thomas, supra note 51, at 22. See also Wagley, supra note 22.
85. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 393 (1990),
quoted in Thomas, supra note 51, at 21.
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most civilized and most secure form of government yet devised
by man."86
Groups struggling for rights and resources within the
United States have a choice of how to view their efforts. One
option is to see the interests of peoples in the United States as
being aligned with those of peoples around the world. Such a
position could lead to support of stronger first, second, and third
generation human rights in all contexts. Another option is to see
people in the United States, even those who are poor or dis-
criminated against in some way, as benefiting, if only margin-
ally, from the relatively higher standard of living available in the
United States. This view leads to efforts to preserve that bene-
fit, even if it is obtained through the enforcement of an inequi-
table distribution of global resources.
These are choices that need to be discussed further. Open-
ing up the subject of group rights, and the related questions of
redistributing resources, is always controversial. It triggers
fears of "Balkanization," fears that acknowledging group rights,
or perhaps even talking about them, will be divisive. To discuss
these issues, difficult questions must be addressed. What is a
"group," and which groups should be recognized as having
rights? Would recognition of religious groups violate the sepa-
ration of church and state? Would recognition of racially identi-
fied groups lead to entrenchment of what are increasingly rec-
ognized as invalid classifications? Should white survivalists or
others who deny the legitimacy of the federal government have
group rights protected by that government?
These issues do not go away simply because they are not
discussed. Although protection of individual rights is firmly
grounded in the U.S. political structure, the rights and opportu-
nities available to individuals have been closely related to their
group affiliations. Much of our history is the history of groups-
the treatment of and response by native peoples, racial and eth-
nic minorities, organized labor, and religious groups, to name a
few. Generally speaking, the political and legal response to dis-
crimination based on group affiliation has been to guarantee
rights to individuals, regardless of their group affiliation.
86. Thomas, supra note 51, at 18 n.11 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6).
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There are problems, however, with trying to resolve all so-
cial issues individualistically. One difficulty is that the sum of
individual interests may not be equal to the whole of the group
interest. A classic example of this is the "problem of the com-
mons." Without collective decisionmaking and control over a
common resource, the individual incentive may be to use as
much as possible, thereby depleting the resource in a way that is
in no one's long term interest.
Atomizing the group can leave everyone worse off in other
ways. In the 1880s, the U.S. government attempted to divide up
Native American lands that were being held in trust and to allot
them to individual Native Americans, who were then promised
U.S. citizenship. 87 In essence, this was a attempt to turn the
group rights of Native Americans into individual rights-an ex-
periment which resulted in the loss of land, natural resources,
communities, and access to culture and history. Similar issues
were raised in the debates sparked by the Black Manifesto and
other calls for reparations for African-Americans in the 1960s
and 1970s. 88 The likelihood that individualized reparations
would do little, if anything, to address institutionalized racism
raises again the need to assess group rights.8 9
There is a fear, expressed most often with respect to racial
tensions, that the divisions within the United States will tear
the society apart. Some believe that these divisions are best ad-
dressed by dismantling, or at least ignoring, the groups them-
selves.90 However, as long as people see themselves as having
common interests, or as having their rights denied because of
their group affiliations, they will struggle together to assert
those interests or rights. The government can respond by re-
pressing those movements, or by recognizing them and providing
some assurance that the rights of groups will be protected.
87. See generally Allotment Act, ch. 119, Stat. 388 (1987) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988)); Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the
Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963 (1996).
88. See BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 71-86 (1973).
89. Another problem with individualized rights and remedies is that, in a majoritar-
ian political system the rights of minorities, can be systematically suppressed by the
majority. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
90. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA:
REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of
Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV.
993 (1995).
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While some assert that the problems of "Balkanization" come
from the recognition of group rights, it may be that they arise
when the rights of those groups, and the individuals who com-
pose them, are endangered.
Other nations have addressed these issues in many different
ways. There is much to be learned from the treatment of native
peoples and French-Canadians in Canada, from the Soviet Un-
ion's establishment of semi-autonomous regions, and from the
experiences of postcolonial African nations in balancing national
interests with ethnic, religious, or linguistic affinities.9' Under-
standing how third generation rights have come to be asserted in
these contexts can enrich perspectives and discussions about
rights within the United States. As Dorothy Thomas states,
"stronger links to the international community may encourage
greater national solidarity. By placing domestic struggles in an
international context, U.S. rights activists may have an oppor-
tunity to ease the racial and class tensions that can often frus-
trate cooperation at local and national levels.
''92
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the tremendous influence that the United States has
on the rest of the world, and despite the fact that images from
around the globe are constantly available on television and in
other media, most of the thinking in the United States remains
sharply divided into "American" and "foreign." A common per-
ception is that while other countries may have human rights
problems, the United States has civil rights concerns; concerns
which can generally be resolved by better enforcement of existing
domestic law.
Even those who struggle for second and third generation
human rights in the United States-for universal health care, a
cleaner environment, or the recognition of the rights of indige-
nous peoples--often see their efforts as being in a different realm
from the issues "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia or
political prisoners in the Sudan or child labor in Pakistan. The
idea that international human rights law not only applies to the
United States, but that it can extend the protections and options
91. Thomas, supra note 51, at 22.
92. See generally Steiner, supra note 44, at 22.
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currently available is rarely discussed.
This essay has sketched the outlines of international human
rights law and identified aspects of "second" and "third" genera-
tion human rights law relevant to efforts to improve life for all
people in the United States. The U.S. government has been re-
luctant to acknowledge that international law could provide pro-
tections beyond those available under U.S. law, and hesitant to
recognize anything beyond civil rights. Nonetheless, in the
terms of international human rights law, many battles have
been fought for economic, social, and cultural rights (i.e. second
generation rights) and in that process, many groups have exer-
cised (and sometimes articulated) third generation human
rights.93
Some see recognition of group rights as creating divisions.
However, it may be that social divisions are best addressed by
protecting group rights, and that some individual rights cannot
be effectively exercised without such protection. These possi-
bilities should be discussed. It is time to look beyond civil rights.
We need to expand the discourse to include explicit debates
about social, economic, and cultural rights and the rights of
groups in U.S. law, debates which are foreclosed by accepting the
notion that human rights are limited to civil and political rights.
93. Mark Tushnet points out that:
[D]istinctions among rights have always been unstable in fact, though par-
ticipants in any particular legal culture tend to believe that their culture's
definitions of the categories are embedded in the nature of society. Today the
differences are taken to be that social rights are more contingent than civil
rights and that only civil rights are appropriate subjects for judicial enforce-
ment. I argue ... that these differences are no less contingent than the ones
Reconstruction legal culture found to be natural.
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